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 Abstract 
Social networks of family and friends are very important in providing economic and 
social support to households. The massive internal migration flows towards the big cities in 
the transition countries like Albania can seriously affect such networks, and influence the 
support received. Previous migration studies have analysed mostly the transfers between the 
migrant and the family left behind. This study analyses households that migrate together to 
the peripheries of Tirana (Albania) after the fall of the communist regime. The frequencies 
of transfers received before and after migration are used to test the change in the 
composition of transfers and the substitution of family members by friends after migrating. 
The empirical analysis shows that households receive fewer transfers after migration, but 
financial transfers increase. Friends become increasingly more important after migration, 
substituting for transfers from siblings and more distant family relatives. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Kinship and friendship networks provide their members with continuous support 
both in everyday life and in sudden or unforeseen events. In every society, households rely 
on such networks for economic, social and emotional support. Self-identification with these 
networks is often a necessary means for gaining the additional security that they can offer. 
Migration can therefore be a serious threat to this support and security. As migration 
relocates family members, splits families and exposes migrants to new people and different 
cultural practices, it is also likely to affect the kinship and friendship networks and the 
support received by their members. Two important questions arising from these situations 
are: How would the structure and intensity of transfers received by relatives and friends 
change after migration? And, would transfers from friends substitute transfers from family 
relatives? 
The present study examines the impact of internal migration on transfers received 
from family members and friends. Our data come from a unique household survey focused 
on migrants that moved after the fall of communism in peri-urban areas of Tirana, the 
capital of Albania, Tirana, We analyse how internal migration of the households has 
affected the different transfers received, and to what extent after migration transfers from 
friends substitute for transfers from family members.  We focus in particular on transfers of 
money, goods and services received by the household. By looking at transfers received we 
are able to also control for the effect of socio-economic characteristics of households. We 
also check these results comparing them to transfers that the same households give to their 
family members or friends. Based on previous literature and Albania’s particular migration 
dynamics, we test the following hypotheses: (1) Financial transfers became more important 
after migration. (2) After migration, households substitute transfers from family members 
with transfers from non-family members (such as friends, neighbours, etc).  
Internal migration in Albania during the communist regime (1945-1990) was 
centrally controlled. In fact, permanent relocation was not legally allowed (without prior 
permission) until 1993, although many people already started moving a few years earlier. 
With the fall of totalitarian regime in 1991, the country faced severe social and economic 
challenges. The mass layoffs that followed the shutdown of mines, plants, and inefficient 
state-owned enterprises created an immense pressure on the labour market. The agricultural 
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land reform of 1991 authorized subdivision of former state-owned land to households based 
on equitable share basis (World Bank 2006). In many areas, especially the mountainous 
ones, this land was insufficient, and moreover the process was accompanied by many 
difficulties and irregularities (World Bank 2004).  
Being left with few other possibilities, people from former industrial towns or 
remote villages started migrating either internationally (mainly towards the neighbouring 
countries, Italy or Greece), or internally (towards the main cities in the coastal area and 
Tirana). Official data show that almost one in three adults has migrated internally since 
birth (World Bank 2007). Internal migrants first occupied former agricultural lands in the 
peri-urban areas of big cities, which soon developed into major settlements. 
Internal migration in Albania is often characterised by relocation of the whole 
household, instead of one to two adults moving, as is seen in many other migration 
contexts. Moreover, unlike in other former Communist countries, migration is not circular. 
Earlier studies indicate that internal movers come from all socio-economic backgrounds (De 
Soto et al. 2002; Cila 2006), and the main motivation behind migration seems to be 
economic, i.e. work-related (Carletto et al. 2004). Our qualitative interviews also show that 
often whole families and even villages relocated to the same area, moving for 
environmental, employment or education reasons. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
This study is based on a unique household survey that was conducted in 2008 
amongst internal migrant households living in peri-urban households in Tirana, covering 
two types of households (households with nuclear and extended families). Figure 1 below 
depicts a map of Albania on which the district of origin of the surveyed households are 
marked. It shows that migrant households come from nearly all districts, but especially from 
the Northern and Central mountainous areas (the darker areas on the map). 
For many of these migrant households the impact of migration has been far from 
successful. Previous studies show that unemployment is very high (Cila 2005 and Hagen-
Zanker & Azzarri 2010), and consumption is lower after migration, even though household 
income may be higher (Hagen-Zanker & Azzarri 2010). This shows that households face 
volatile circumstances and may still be highly dependent on inter-household transfers, 
especially when migration has been less successful than anticipated. Furthermore, the 
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composition of the supporting network may also be affected by internal migration. 
Households may leave family members behind due to internal migration and many also 
have family that migrated internationally. At the same time, households are exposed to 
other migrants coming from all areas of Albania and living in very condensed living 
conditions. This could also lead to more exchange and interactions with non-family 
members than before.  
In this paper we investigate the impact of migration on transfers (money, goods and 
service transfers) received from family members and friends. The study relates both to the 
economic analysis of inter-household transfers and the impact of internal migration and 
follows in the footsteps of a few papers (Blumberg & Bell 1959; Litwak 1960; Jitodai 1963; 
Bengtson & Roberts 1991) that combine the two research areas. Studies focusing on the 
impact of internal migration on transfers for complete family relocation are limited in 
number. The previous literature focuses mainly on demographic changes in the United 
States in the mid 20
th
 century. The present study analyses this issue much more thoroughly 
utilising both qualitative interviews and advanced econometric techniques. Furthermore, we 
focus on a transition economy where the role of private transfers is much more important. 
Internal migration is high in Albania, poverty in peri-urban areas remains wide-spread and 
state support is low. This makes the investigation of private transfers and their development 
over time an interesting and relevant research question.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Transfers from family and friends can be motivated by many reasons. The 
economic literature is divided between the two main sets of arguments on such motives: the 
altruistic and the selfish/egoistic ones. The roots of the altruism argument are to found in 
sociobiological research where an altruistic person is considered someone who gives up 
own fitness to increase the fitness of others (Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971). In economics, 
an altruistic person is considered someone whose utility does not only depend on own 
consumption, but also on the consumption of their family members (Becker 1974; Becker 
1976). Consequently, an altruistic transfer will be the one triggered by a drop in the utility 
of one of the family members. The purpose of the transfers is to compensate this utility 
drop. Altruistic transfers occur mostly between close relatives (i.e. a parent caring about the 
utility of his/her children). Many economists argue that, even for close relatives, there may 
 6
be other selfish/egoistic motives triggering the transfers. These motives relate to exchange 
(Chiappori 1988; Cox and Rank 1992), indirect returns or induced reciprocity (Fehr and 
Gächter 1998).  
Despite the discussion on the various motives, economists and researchers from 
other disciplines agree that motives for transfers to closest family members may differ from 
motives for transfers to friends. Arguments like altruism are based largely on genetic roots 
(i.e. a parent is concerned about the transmission of his/her genes across generations), while 
relationships with friends are mostly based on societal norms of reciprocity (i.e. reciprocal 
altruism) and common interests. Transfers to friends are believed to be triggered more from 
non-altruistic motives like social norms, social effects and self-interest (Trivers 1971; 
Kolm, 2006). But, if transfers to family and friends are triggered by different motives, can 
they substitute each-other? Can migrant households substitute the support they get from 
family networks with that of non-relatives and friends? 
The degree of helping and resource sharing is a clear and measurable indicator of 
family solidarity, which can vary over different networks or over time. More specifically, 
economic relationships between kinship members may be characterized by transfers of 
money, goods, or services rendered. Bengtson & Roberts (1991) argue that helping and 
resource sharing is one of the most important aspects of family solidarity. Changes affecting 
the structures of kinship networks can consequently affect the patterns of resource sharing. 
People’s mobility through migration (and especially rural-to-urban migration) is considered 
to be an important factor that influences kinship ties (Blumberg & Bell 1959). Mulder and 
Cooke (2009), using data from Netherlands Kinship Panel Study show that location of other 
family members outside the household may impede households from moving (when other 
relatives live nearby the household), or trigger internal migration (when other relatives live 
far away). 
Whether migration takes place at all is also influenced by the strength of kinship 
networks. The migration network literature shows how kinship networks help potential 
migrants to migrate and then help migrants to find employment, housing etc. at the 
destination (i.e. Goss & Lindquist 1995). Choldin (1973) also emphasizes chain migration 
and help given to kin to also migrate. Through chain migration social networks may be 
reproduced in the new community. An important consequence of rural-to-urban migration is 
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that it is usually accompanied by a placement within clusters of kin relatives coming from 
the same areas (Blumberg and Bell 1959; Hendrix 1975). This may lead to the preservations 
of certain relations and habits, and may even contribute to reinforce them. What is clear, is 
that the decision to migrate internally is both affected by the kinship networks and at the 
same time affects the relationships within the same networks.  
Previous studies have shown that permanent internal migration has pervasive 
effects on families and kinship networks. Duke-Williams (2009) argues that mobility and 
migration are key drivers in changes in households. Peoples’ mobility contributes to the 
separation of households and the creation of new households. Blumberg and Bell (1959) 
argue that rural to urban migration changes the structure of kinship relationships. These 
changes are a consequence of the “dysfunctionality of the urban setting for a kinship 
relationship” since urban settings are usually different from those of villages or small 
towns. The same authors further argue that in urban settings the importance of the family 
and kinship tends to decline, while residual functions (i.e. visits) may stay intact on the 
other hand and may become even stronger. In contrast, other studies cited by Blumberg and 
Bell (1959), show that a good part of rural migrants receive help from friends or relatives 
when they first move to urban areas.  
Litwak’s (1960) study in New York concludes that mobility reduced face-to-face 
contact, but not “extended family identification”, i.e. feeling close to the extended family. 
He finds that over time family contacts are still as likely as before, but that long-term 
residents are more likely to be in contact with neighbours or belonging to a club. Jitodai 
(1963) finds that at arrival rural migrants in Detroit have higher rates of contact with their 
kin, than urban migrants, possibly because rural migrants are followed by their family. Over 
time contact rates for rural migrants stay more or less stable and those for urban migrants 
increase, becoming similar to contact rates of natives and of rural migrants. Migration thus 
did not hinder migrants in keeping in touch with their kin. Wellman et al. (1997) also 
looked at social networks in Toronto in the 1970s. Kinship ties were most likely to remain 
ten years after the original survey, also for households that moved, while some ties with 
neighbours were lost for the households that moved. Ruan et al. (1997) look at the changing 
structure of social networks in Tiajin, China and find that between 1986 and 1993 
individuals named fewer kin members as personal ties, while friends became relatively 
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more important. The authors attribute this to changing policies in China that allowed for 
more residential and occupational mobility, which has some similarities with Albania’s 
situation after 1989.  
With regard to the type of support received by the households in transition 
countries, there are few existing studies. Cox, Jimenez and Okrasa (1996) compare family 
solidarity before and after transition (1987 vs. 1992) in Poland. They find the same 
incidence of financial transfers in real terms, despite a worse economic situation, so family 
solidarity is somewhat weaker. Vullnetari & King (2008) describe a growing trend of “care 
drain” in Albania, namely the effect migration of adult children has on their elderly parents. 
They depict a pattern of fewer visits (as they mainly refer to international migration) and 
less care, both by parents (care of the grandchildren) and children (care of their parents). 
Even though financial transfers from migrant children to parents rise in some instances, 
they do not make up for the shortfall in physical care. In short, family solidarity weakens as 
result of migration. 
The literature on determinants of remittances focuses on financial family transfers 
between the migrant and the family left behind. The literature predicts that there are 
financial transfers from the migrant to the household and wider family left behind due to a 
wide range of motives ranging from altruism to self-interest. There could also be transfers 
to the migrant, as part of a co-insurance agreement, for example when the migrant is 
temporarily unemployed (see Stark 1991). The remittances literature would predict that 
there are more financial transfers between the family members after the move than before, 
since migrants generally migrate in order to remit. Finally the exchange motive would 
predict a rise in services from the household left behind to the migrants (e.g. taking care of 
children left behind) simultaneously with a rise in financial transfers from the migrant to the 
household. Even though in Albania’s case generally the whole household moves (INSTAT 
2004), the remittances literature has some relevance. The motives for financial transfers, for 
example supporting needy family members, may explain changes in transfer patterns. 
In conclusion, we expect that internal migration influences the type of transfers 
exchanged and support received from family members and friends. As migration prolongs 
the distances between family members and generates higher financial resources, we expect 
the importance of financial transfers to grow and services to decrease after migration. Even 
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if family members move together (as it is often the case in Albania), we expect that the 
increasing support from new friends and acquaintances (due to the integration of migrants 
in the new community) would undermine the existing kinship ties. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The survey was administered by the authors, with the assistance of a team of 
students from Tirana University in April 2008. The sample was selected from the four main 
neighbourhoods that were populated after 1990 and accommodate a large migrant 
population. Each of those neighbourhoods has a slightly different migrant population, for 
example households living in Bathore are more likely to come from the Northern 
mountainous areas of Albania and are more likely to live in extended families. The selected 
households were distributed across the areas according to the size of these areas and 
importance of migrant inflows for these areas, which means that almost half of the sample 
was collected in Bathore, as this is the biggest peri-urban area and also has the largest 
migrant population. 
By absence of street names and accurate population registers, the sample was quasi-
randomised by sub-dividing selected areas into strata of around one km
2
 using satellite 
maps and then randomly selecting houses in selected strata. The sub-sections were then 
assigned to interviewers, who also marked the exact location of interviewed households on 
the map. If the selected households did not fit the criteria of being an internal migrant 
household (11.48 per cent), or refused to participate (25.68 per cent), a neighbouring house 
was chosen. The positive response rate is 74.32 per cent and in total we interviewed 112 
households. Table 1 below shows the number of households that were selected in each area. 
Two types of questionnaires were used. The main questionnaire has 137 questions 
ranging from information on the main households’ demographics, education, employment, 
income, and migration history to the key section on family solidarity. A total of 26 
households were also interviewed in semi-structured interviews using additional qualitative 
questions. 
In the main section on family solidarity, households are questioned in great detail 
about transfers between the main household and a random selection of extended family 
members and neighbours, who the main household is in regular contact with, both before 
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and after the move. Households were first asked to list all relatives and friends with whom 
they were in contact with on a regular basis and then the interviewer randomly selected two 
relatives in each of five broad categories of relatives (i.e. parents, children, siblings, other 
relatives and friends) by choosing the first two relatives whose first name comes earlier in 
the alphabet. This was followed by basic demographic questions on all family and friends. 
Further questions on the socio-economic characteristics of the relative/ friend and on family 
solidarity were only asked about the selected relatives.  
Households were questioned on the financial transfers, goods and services 
exchanged both in the last twelve months and before the move. In the latter case, 
households were divided broadly in those coming before 1997 and those coming after this 
year. Year 1997 was chosen both as a chronological milestone and because the turmoil that 
followed the collapse of the financial pyramids led to an increase in numbers of especially 
poor migrants to peri-urban areas of large cities. In order to get a similar basis of 
comparison, migrants moving before 1997 were asked about the transfers during the last 12 
months before 1991, and those moving after 1997 about transfers during the last 12 months 
before 1997. Detailed questions were asked on the type/ amount of the transfer and the 
frequency for both before and after the move. In this paper we only make use of the data on 
the receipt of transfers because this allows us to have more control variables based on 
household information. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 gives a short description on the socio-economic characteristics of our 
sample by the neighbourhood the household lives in. Around 96 per cent of the household 
heads sampled are male and about 90 per cent are married and there are no significant 
differences per area. Table 1 below outlines further characteristics. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Household heads are on average 51 years old and have on average 11 years of 
education (; however there are no significant differences between areas. Most household 
heads are Muslim, but significantly fewer in 5 Maji, a more recent peri-urban area. We see 
that household from Coastal origins are significantly strongly represented in Selite, and 
household from Central origins in 5 Maji and Selite. Both are underrepresented in Bathore, 
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where household are significantly more likely to come from North Central and especially 
the mountain areas. Most households we interviewed are nuclear families, but households in 
Bathore are significantly more likely to live in extended families. Consequently they also 
have significantly more family members per household. Households in Bathore have the 
significantly lowest income per capita and households in Selite are significantly richer. 
More households arrived before 1997 in Bathore and Senatorium (these were the areas that 
were first settled), but the difference is not significant. 
We also look at the level of individual kin members and friends the household 
exchanges with. Kin members are classed into broad categories and we compare whether 
household has received transfers from these kin. Not all kin the household named, and that 
was selected, exchanged transfers with the household, as can be seen in table A1 in the 
appendixes. We ask the question on the receipt of transfers for the past 12 months and for 
the situation before migration took place. We analyse three types of transfers: Financial 
transfers, goods and services.  
Table 2 compares transfers by the likelihood of receiving transfers from different kinds of 
kin and friends. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Before migration households were significantly more likely to receive money from 
their children, while households are significantly less likely to have received money from 
children in the past 12 months. This can not only be due to children growing up, since 
households were also significantly more likely to receive money from their children before 
the move and since we also had quite a varied age range of household heads. Households 
are also significantly more likely to have received services from their children before the 
move, whereas we see the opposite pattern in the past 12 months. In the past, households 
were significantly more likely to receive goods from friends while after migration they 
seem to receive more financial transfers from friends, compared to other relatives (not 
significant). So far, the descriptive statistics do not show a clear network change or change 
in the transfer mix. 
Table 3 below shows the transfer frequency from different types of kin. There are 
no significant differences in the frequency of financial transfers received from different kin 
members (except for services) for both before and after migration. It is noteworthy however 
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that the average number of financial transfers has increased from 0.34 to 0.6 transfers 
received per relative. There are also no significant differences for good transfers. However, 
it is interesting that the average good transfer received from children after migration (2.56 
goods transfer per child) is much higher than before (0.7). 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
For services we see that both before and after migration other relatives are the least 
important givers of services. Before migration households received significantly more 
services from siblings and after migration households received significantly more services 
from parents and children. While services remain by far the most frequent transfer received, 
a lower average number of services are exchanged after migration (6.65 down from 9.11 
services per relative). 
3.3 Methodology 
We want to test the determinants of inter-household transfers and also analyse the 
impact of migration on transfer patterns. For this we consider the frequency of receiving 
monetary, goods, and services before migration and in the last 12 months before the survey 
was administered (therefore after migration). In this analysis we focus mainly on the 
receiving of the transfers, although giving yields very similar results (reproduced for the all 
transfers in table A5 in the appendixes). 
We pool the data from before and after migration, accounting for when the transfer 
takes place with the migration dummy. To achieve this we use the same variables for before 
and after migration. When applicable, the variable is adjusted to the period before migration 
(e.g. age, number of children etc.). 
As the transfers occur within a defined limit of time, and the probabilities of 
consecutive transfers are not dependent on each other, we assume that the distribution of 
transfers’ frequencies follows the Poisson distribution. Consequently, the count rate would 
be calculated as: 
)exp()( βµ iii xyE ==        (1) 
where, iµ is the expected value of the model dependent on a vectors of covariates, β  is a 
vector of estimated coefficients, and ix  includes characteristics of receiving household and 
sending family member or friend. The probability of observing a specific count is: 
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However, our data show some particularities that do not satisfy this distribution. We 
notice over-dispersion (variance is greater than mean), and also suspect an excess of “zero” 
values. We suspect that this excess is a result of two main reasons:  
1. Random heterogeneity in frequencies of received transfers. In other words, 
households ‘face’ the same probability of receiving zero or any other frequency of transfers, 
but some households receive more zero or ‘low count’ transfers, and others receive more 
‘high count’ transfers due to idiosyncratic factors or a random bias.  
2. Some households are systematically not receiving transfers because of their 
characteristics. For example, respondents may have had limited contact with their relatives 
or friends in the last 12 months before the move. 
 The standard Poisson model therefore does not satisfy the features of our data. In 
order to investigate what drives the over-dispersion in our data, we extensively compare 
different count models. We compare the “negative binomial regression model” (NBRM) to 
the “zero inflated Poisson” (ZIP) and “zero inflated negative binomial regression” (ZINBR) 
which use a two stage approach. In the first stage zero and non-zero outcomes are modelled, 
and in the second stage the remaining counts are modelled according to the standard 
Poisson (ZIP) or to the negative binomial (ZINBR). 
 We calculate and compare the predicted values of NBRM, ZIP and ZINBR models in 
table A3 and figure A1 in the appendixes. The tests confirm that a simple Poisson model is 
inappropriate in this context, having far less accurate predictions than the other models 
discussed. For all types of transfers, the ZIP model performs better than the standard 
Poisson, but the predictions are less accurate than NBRM and ZINB. This indicates that 
transfers “suffer” mostly from an idiosyncratic and random bias rather than inflated zeros. 
In fact, NBRM and ZINB perform similarly in predicting the probability of counts, 
providing less evidence on the ‘inflated zero’ distortion. We therefore choose to discuss the 
results of NBRM as the model that explains the hidden heterogeneity in the transfers’ 
counts best. As we suspected (see reasons explained in the methodology section), the results 
of estimated ZINB models show that we may have some additional zeros added because of 
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not being in the same district or because of having an extended family. However, the 
improvement to the overall predicted values is not essential and statistical tests show that 
both models are comparable. ZINB results for monetary, goods and service transfers are 
available on request from authors.  
 The NBRM accounts for heterogeneity among count outcomes. The predicted count 
probability is: 
iy
iii
i
i
y
y
yY 





+






+Γ
+Γ
==
φµ
µ
φµ
φ
φ
φ
φ
!)(
)(
)Pr(  , ny ,...3,2,1=     (3) 
where, the variance in the predicted counts is increased through a parameter 
1−φ  accounting 
for the suspected (over)dispersion (see also Freese and Long, 2001). 
 In order to check how the support from different members of the network has 
changed before and after migration we estimate NBRM models separately for before and 
after migration. Differences between coefficients are then checked for significance using 
seemingly unrelated estimation (see also Weesie, 2000). 
 While we have quite a varied range of control variables, our survey does not provide 
us with information on household income or wealth in the past. We are aware that these 
kind of economic indicators are important in explaining differences in transfer patterns, 
therefore we have controlled for it using the present income as a proxy for past incomes 
(results are available from authors). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We use two types of analyses in order to answer whether transfer patterns between 
extended family members have changed as a result of the move. We first analyse the open-
ended qualitative interviews and draw first conclusions from the respondents’ opinions. We 
then analyse the quantitative data using an econometric analysis comparing the results to the 
hypotheses and conclusions from the qualitative analysis. 
4.1 Qualitative analysis 
The open-ended questions are first coded into groups with similar responses for the 
19 open-ended questions that we asked. We count how often respondents answered in a 
similar way and draw conclusions here based on the frequency of certain answers. Table A2 
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in the appendixes gives an overview of the questions asked, coding and number of 
observations for each type of response. 
Even if families are separated by physical distance, many claim that their 
relationship was not negatively affected by this. Many of the interviewed households 
claimed that they meet their families more frequently than before (8 households). Half of 
the interviewed households (13) also claimed that their relationship to other family 
members did not change, with about the same number of households citing an improvement 
or a worsening of their relationships. While some families talked about relationships and 
lives having become more distant and separate, other respondent explain how the separation 
itself has made them closer: 
“My father often goes to visit them. He has a lot of nostalgia.” 
“Yes my relationship with them didn’t change. The distance can’t change the 
affection we have for each other.” 
Many households also feel much closer to their families because they shared the 
experience of moving. Most families moved together with their nuclear, extended family or 
even the whole village (10 households say this explicitly). This means that their whole 
solidarity network is replicated in the city. For example one household head explained: 
“All our neighbours are blood-related; it’s the same big family… All our 
neighbours here were neighbours there.” 
Another household told a similar story: 
“The village of K., around 16 houses, has moved together to this place. The entire 
block belongs to the S. family…. The strongest relations we keep with our neighbourhood, 
the S. families. We are all brothers or cousins up to the fourth degree. We have very good 
relations.” 
There are about an equal number of households that claim that they have more/ 
fewer friends or contacts with neighbours. Many households are thus still exchanging with 
the same people. 
While family relationships thus often remained close, the type of transfers 
exchanged between household members changed. Despite the high unemployment which 
almost all respondents name as their greatest problem, in general households benefited 
financially from the move (see also Hagen-Zanker & Azzarri, 2008). We see that financial 
transfers are becoming more important. This allows them to give and receive more financial 
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transfers (3 out of 5 households say they receive more financial transfers). At the same time 
less help is needed, than in an agricultural setting (4 out of 5 households say that they 
receive less services). Many respondents pointed out this shift from services to financial 
transfers: 
“To be realistic, if I would have to help everyone I would have to give up my day of 
work, so the help is more limited to monetary terms and not physical anymore.” 
“At that time you needed some help to work the land. Now you need more financial 
help.” 
“Yes with money now and in the past with work.” 
One respondent even declared that financial solidarity replaces social solidarity to 
some extent: 
“Economic relations are better now. Affective relationships are less good. When 
you get a bit richer you grow apart a bit.” 
The exchange of goods exchange of goods remains in between financial and service 
transfers. We see that certain kinds of good transfers, i.e. food products, have become less 
important. This is because households now grow and collect less food than in rural areas 
and are therefore less able to give food products, as these respondents explain: 
“Here we buy all things in shops. There is no reason to ask your neighbour for 
something because the shop is there. Before it was different, we exchanged more goods.” 
“We help each other less because now we don’t own agricultural land, so we have 
fewer products to help each other.” 
“Yes, there [referring to village of origin] the people can help more than here 
because they have cows, grow vegetables etc.” 
Even though migration seem to have some small effects on the relatives that 
households choose to exchange transfer with, a preferences for known relatives remain 
mostly unchallenged. Furthermore financial transfers are now more important than in the 
past.  
 
4.2 Econometric results 
Table 4 below gives the results from the NBRM for financial, goods and services 
received. We pool the data from before and after migration, accounting for when the 
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transfer takes place with the migration dummy. To achieve this we use the same variables 
for before and after migration. 
 The tests at the bottom of table 4, and in table A3 in the appendixes measure whether 
the NBRM model is the appropriate model to use in this context. The results in table A3 
show what the actual and predicted mean count for all transfers is for each of the models 
and the difference (how much the prediction diverges from the actual count). The Pearson 
test is a chi-squared test of independence and also indicates how close the predicted count is 
to the actual count. We see that generally the NBRM model is one of the models predicting 
the best results. In table 4, the likelihood ratio Chibar squared statistic allows us to see if the 
NBRM should be used instead of standard Poisson. The very low values of the probability 
suggest over-dispersion, and therefore the use of NBRM is appropriate. 
 Our variable of interest “transfer after migration”, which is a dummy variable (“0” 
for the transfers before migration, and “1” for the transfers after), is highly significant for all 
transfers combined (see table A4) and the separate transfers. This shows that migration has 
affected significantly the transfers received. Below we discuss the different types of 
transfers.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
  For receiving financial transfers, the variable of interest “transfer after migration” 
has a strong significant effect, indicating that financial transfers have become more frequent 
after migration and confirming the qualitative analysis and Hypothesis 1. This means that 
for a given transfer partner and all other parameters being equal, financial transfers are 
received 0.3 more frequently by an average household after migration. 
 The dummy variables for the relatives show that friends give money more frequently 
than parents, children, or other relatives, but less frequently than siblings. However, this 
effect is not significant for any of the relatives.  
  The other dummy variable, “gender of household head”, has a positive effect on the 
transfers received (female headed households receive more frequently) and “gender of 
relative” has a negative effect (women relatives gives less frequently). This does not 
necessarily show that women tend to give less frequently, but rather that transfers may be 
explained by the particular situation of the households. Most of the female headed 
households happen to be in financial difficulties either because of the loss of the main 
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breadwinner (i.e. widow headed households, as divorcees are very rare) or are in vulnerable 
situation due to the informal and unstable labour market. Albanian society preserves 
patriarchal norms where the men are always declared as the head of the household, and 
therefore male headed households make up for most of our sample. Households that moved 
before 1997 seem to receive monetary transfers less frequently than others. This can be 
explained by the “relative success” that these households have in financial terms due to 
more stable and better paid jobs (see Hagen-Zanker & Azzarri, 2008). Most other control 
variables are significant and the coefficients have the expected signs.  
 Coming to goods, the variable of interest “transfer after migration” is highly 
significant and negative. More specifically, for a given transfer partner and all other 
parameters being equal, an average household after migration receives 1.9 less frequent 
good transfers. Based on the informal interviews it appears that this pattern is driven by 
changes in the nature of goods that are exchanged. Before migration, the goods that were 
exchanged consisted mainly of food and agricultural products, which are exchanged 
repeatedly. After migration, food is exchanged less frequently as people grow less of it in 
peri-urban areas. However, people now exchange gifts on special occasions, like birthdays, 
maybe due to changing cultural practices and more financial wealth from migration. These 
kinds of transfers take place non-frequently.  
 Looking at the relatives that give goods to the household we see that family relatives 
are generally more important givers of goods than friends (not significant for “Relative 
other”). The variable “Education years of household head” has a positive and significant 
effect showing that the most educated (and therefore those with higher chance of success in 
the labour market) receive goods from their kin members more frequently. Extended family 
households receive goods less frequently since they have stronger links with persons within 
their own household (the survey only measures inter-households transfers). 
 Finally, for service transfers, the main variable of interest “transfer after migration” 
is strongly significant and negative. This means that for a given transfer partner and all 
other parameters being equal, there are 5.2 fewer service transfers received by a given 
household after migration. The results that less goods and services and more financial 
transfers are received by households confirm Hypothesis 1. These results are not surprising 
given our qualitative interviews: Relatives that are often also internal or international 
migrants are now much more able to give financially due to better-paid employment and 
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have less time to spend on other transfers (such as services) due to increased distances and a 
different employment structure. 
 Coming to relatives, we again see that all relatives (except children) are significantly 
less important than friends in terms of frequency of service transfers. Again we suspect this 
to be a consequence of migration and we confirm this by running models separately for 
before and after migration (see discussion below). Education of the household head again 
has a positive effect on frequency of services (confirming the same trend we noticed for 
goods). The number of children also has a positive effect suggesting that most of services 
exchanged are also related to child minding activities. As expected living in the same 
district has a strong positive effect. This confirms previous studies (e.g. Mulder & van der 
Meer, 2009) that highlight the importance of geographical proximity for receiving service 
support. The other variables have the expected signs and are generally significant.  
 Of course transfers are not mutually exclusive; therefore we also include a NBRM 
regression that measures the probability of having a certain frequency of transfers including 
a combination of transfers (a sum of the frequencies of total transfers received). The results 
are included in table A4 in the appendixes and strongly confirm our previous findings. The 
increased monetary transfers after migration have been associated with a decrease in goods 
and services and therefore the overall effect of migration is a decline in the combination of 
transfers. Apart from the above arguments explaining the decline of both goods and 
services, we can also attribute this to the increasing value placed on individuality and 
independence after migration, a comment that was often brought up by respondents in the 
qualitative interview stage. 
 Friends transfer more frequently than parents, siblings (not significant) or other 
relatives, but less than children. We suspect that the migration has played a role in this (see 
Hypothesis 2), and therefore investigate this further. 
 Table 5 gives differences in coefficients for relatives as compared to friends 
estimated in separate NBRMs for before and after migration and measures whether this 
difference is significant. Control variables used are the same as in table 4.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 For financial transfers we see that after migration, siblings and other relatives have 
become relatively less important (negative and significant difference in coefficients) 
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compared to friends. The same holds for parents (though difference is not significant). 
However, transfers from children have not declined in frequency, even though we have to 
treat this result with caution as children have a low number of non-zero observations (see 
table A1). 
 The results are further confirmed for transfers of goods, where the positive and 
significant difference of coefficients for children shows that they are transferring more 
frequently after migration. On the other hand, part of the role of transfers from other 
members of kinship is superseded by transfers from friends (however, results are not 
significant).  
 The same trend is also confirmed for service transfers where most of the differences 
in coefficients for the family members are significant (not significant for transfers from 
children). The effects are stronger for these transfers given their particular characteristics 
(physical distance is essential in delivering frequent services to relatives). 
 Generally, all the above results confirm that migration has partially shifted the 
transfers towards particular members of kinship or friends. Transfers from children and 
friends become increasingly important after migration, especially for services, while the 
effects are not always significant but consistent. The findings indicate that some change in 
the network takes place after migration, thus confirming Hypothesis 2. 
 An additional explanatory variable that is likely to affect transfers received is income 
or wealth of the household. As explained above, we do not include this control variable in 
our main model, as we do not know the household’s income before internal migration. 
However, tests using current per capita income show that the signs, statistical significance 
and size of the noteworthy regressors are not affected much by controlling for income. This 
strengthens our previous results. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper is based on an unique survey amongst internal migrant households in 
peri-urban Tirana, Albania conducted in April 2008. Internal migration to peri-urban areas 
of major cities is a wide-spread phenomenon in the country and is often characterized by 
migration of entire families. We are particularly interested in how the change of location 
through internal migration has affected the reliance on family members and friends and the 
patterns of transfers. For this, we look at three main transfers (financial, goods, and 
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services) and investigate the changes in receiving patterns both at the current moment and 
before migration. By exploiting both a quantitative survey and additional qualitative 
interviews, we show that migration has affected the combination of transfers that 
households receive, towards more frequent financial transfers (Hypothesis 1) and has also 
had some effect on the composition of the family network on which they rely upon 
(Hypothesis 2). 
The first hypothesis relates to the effect of migration on the receipt of different 
transfers, looking at the intensity of receiving a certain transfer. Financial transfers seem to 
be more frequent after migration. While the effect is positive and significant, its marginal 
effect is smaller than for other types of transfers. On average, households receive 0.3 
financial transfers more after migration from a given relative (ceteris paribus). The shift 
towards financial transfers seems logical: After migration households are more in the need 
of financial transfers than before. Previous studies (Cila 2006; Hagen-Zanker & Azzarri 
2010) confirm that unemployment is high amongst internal migrant households and that 
living costs have increased compared to living in rural areas (i.e. having to pay for water). 
Living in these highly populated and informal peri-urban areas where the role of the state is 
weaker and poverty rates are higher than the inner city (Zezza et al.2005), increases 
vulnerability and dependency of households on private financial transfers from family and 
friends.  While one of the migration effects is expected to be improvement of financial 
inflow, the higher vulnerability of these households may explain why financial transfers are 
received more frequently after migration. 
The change in frequency of transfers of goods received after migration is also 
interesting. The frequency of receiving goods transfers decreased after migration, and 
households receive 1.9 goods transfers less on average from a given family member (ceteris 
paribus). This is a big drop in goods received and based on the qualitative interviews it 
appears that this pattern is driven by changes in the nature of goods that are exchanged. 
Before migration, goods exchanged were mainly food and agricultural products, which are 
exchanged repeatedly. After migration, food is exchanged less frequently as people grow 
less of it in peri-urban areas. However, they exchange gifts on special occasions, like 
birthdays, more often, maybe due to changing cultural practices and more financial wealth 
from migration. These kinds of transfers take place non-frequently. 
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Finally, our results show that households receive service transfers less often after 
migration. On average a household received a service 5.2 times fewer services from a given 
relative (ceteris paribus). This is logical, as services require proximity of transaction 
partners and migration is likely to have split some of the family networks. This is reinforced 
by the result that service transfers are more likely and frequent, if the household and kinship 
member live in the same district. Furthermore households and kinship members that have 
also migrated internally are probably less able to give services due to lack of time, brought 
about by volatile employment and more time spent on job search. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the shift of transfers between family members 
and friends. When examining all transfers combined, we see that after migration the role of 
transfers received from family members has decreased if compared to transfers from 
friends.  With the exception of children, transfers from friends are becoming more frequent 
than from all other family members. This is somewhat surprising given the qualitative 
analysis, which revealed that the whole extended family networks and even villages moved 
together, and which also showed that households have a very conservative attitude towards 
strangers. Transfers from friends rise in importance compared to those from parents, 
siblings and other relatives, but the effect is not always significant. The results show that in 
particular friends supersede siblings for financial transfers, and both siblings and other 
relatives for services. This may be related to the nature of such transfers. Financial transfers 
are less personal, which may explain the rising importance of friends giving these transfers, 
despite the conservative nature of internal migrant households. On the other hand, distance 
is an essential condition determining the frequency of service transfers. In conclusion, we 
see some changes in the family network households rely on, but no complete 
transformation. 
The above conclusions are drawn on a small-scale household survey in a very 
specific context. Whether the results on the continuing reliance on family members are 
generally applicable is yet to be proved. In the Albanian case, whole families and even 
villages relocated permanently. Due to the specific nature of Albanian internal migration 
and the conservative nature of the migrants, transfer networks stayed closely integrated. 
This is very different in other internal migration contexts, e.g. China, where only one family 
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members moves. Different patterns of migration are likely to affect the continuation and 
strength of pre-migration networks.  
The other main conclusion, the switch to financial transfers after migration is 
probably even more pronounced in other migration contexts. Migration makes family 
members more physically distant, and thus less able to exchange goods and services. 
Furthermore migration towards (better) paid employment allows people to exchange more 
financial transfers.  
The continuing and high levels of private support to migrant households are 
valuable in a transition context, where poverty is wide-spread and state support is low. Our 
findings suggest that in absence of public mechanisms, migrant households resort to private 
transfers for financial resources. It was shown that both receiving and giving financial 
transfers increase after internal migration. However, it is questionable whether these 
financial resources are an adequate and sustainable source. Moreover, this study has shown 
that services and goods transfers received by households decrease after migration.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Household characteristics in the sampled areas 
Area 5 Maji Bathore Selite Senatorium Total 
Age household head 53.53 49.6 50 52.75 50.93 
Education household head 11.37 10.4 10.93 11.65 10.92 
Household head Muslim 0.74* 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.87 
Household head Coastal origin 0.05 0.02* 0.25*** 0.00 0.08 
Household head Central origin 0.63** 0.09*** 0.61*** 0.45 0.38 
Household head North Central 
origin 0.11 0.22** 0.04* 0.10 0.13 
Household head Mountain origin 0.21* 0.67*** 0.11*** 0.45 0.41 
Household is extended family 0.21 0.33** 0.11* 0.15 0.22 
Household arrived before 1997 0.37 0.49 0.32 0.45 0.42 
Number of household members 4.74 5.87*** 4.32** 4.35 5.02 
Number of observations 19 45 28 20 112 
Income/ capita 16872.81 8049.93*** 20053.09*** 14325 13764.94 
Number of observations 19 42 27 20 108 
Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is significantly different from the total mean (* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
 
Table 2. Transfer likelihood from family and friends 
Type of kin the hh receives 
transfers from 
Parents 
& 
parents 
in law 
Children Siblings Relatives Friends Total 
Hh received financial transfer 
before migration 
0.09 0.19** 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 
Hh received financial transfer in 
past 12 months 
0.19 0.07*** 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.17 
Hh received goods before 
migration 
0.21 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.33** 0.22 
Hh received goods in past 12 
months 
0.33 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.28 
Hh received services before 
migration 
0.3 0.44** 0.31 0.29 0.4 0.31 
Hh received services in past 12 
months 
0.31 0.19* 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 
Number of observations 71-86 22-34 196-216 107-126 24-106 1064 
Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is significantly different from the total mean (* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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Table 3. Transfer frequency from different types of kin 
Type of kin the hh receives transfers 
from 
Parents 
& 
parents 
in law 
Children Siblings Relatives Friends Total 
Frequency financial transfer before 
migration 
0.29 0 0.25 0.66 0.04 0.34 
Frequency financial transfer in past 12 
months 
0.5 0.17 0.68 0.42 0.92 0.6 
Frequency goods transfer before 
migration 
3.26 0.7 3.5 2.18 2.36 2.89 
Frequency goods transfer in past 12 
months 
3.16 2.56 2.39 1.62 1.26 2.18 
Frequency services transfer from 
before migration 
11.26 14.38 10.88* 4.79*** 7.93 9.11 
Frequency services transfer in past 12 
months 
8.81* 12.89*** 7.08 3.35*** 6.73 6.65 
Number of observations 61-151 18-54 182-407 110-235 25-132 397-987 
Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is significantly different from the total mean (* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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Table 4. Frequency of the receiving transfers: Results from NBRM 
 Financial transfers Good transfers Service transfers 
 Coef. st. error Coef. st. error Coef. st. error 
Main regression       
Transfer after migration 1.01*** 0.32 -1.08*** 0.26 -1.00*** 0.28 
Relative parent 0.05 0.61 1.28** 0.54 -1.09* 0.6 
Relative child -0.51 0.86 2.10*** 0.64 0.48 0.67 
Relative sibling 0.25 0.41 0.73* 0.37 -0.81* 0.42 
Relative other -0.26 0.47 0.02 0.38 -1.83*** 0.45 
(Friends)       
Age hhh (now/ before 
migration) -0.03** 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Hh head  male 1.35** 0.64 -0.91 0.64 -0.27 0.82 
Education years hhh -0.04 0.06 0.08** 0.03 0.08* 0.05 
Hhh’s religion Muslim 1.00* 0.52 0.99** 0.43 0.28 0.48 
(Hhh’s religion Catholic, 
orthodox, or other)       
Hhh’s origin Central -0.65 0.54 0.5 0.44 0.91* 0.5 
Hhh’s origin North-Central -0.24 0.61 0.32 0.53 0.57 0.58 
Hhh’s  origin Mountain -0.73 0.54 -0.5 0.47 0.25 0.51 
(Hhh’s  origin Coast)       
Hh extended family (now/ 
before migration) 0.37 0.29 -0.60** 0.27 -0.61** 0.28 
Number of children hh (now/ 
before migration) -0.15 0.15 -0.06 0.12 0.35*** 0.13 
Years since migration -0.06* 0.04 0.05** 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Age relative/ friend (now/ 
before migration) 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Relative/ friend male -1.30*** 0.29 -0.06 0.26 0.34 0.27 
Education years relative/ friend 0.07 0.05 0 0.04 -0.09** 0.04 
Hh & relative/ friend same 
religion -0.58 0.58 0.13 0.52 -0.37 0.65 
Hh & relative/ friend live in 
same district (now/ before 
migration) 1.15*** 0.32 0.26 0.29 1.17*** 0.29 
Constant -2.19 1.66 0.25 1.33 2.84* 1.51 
Ln alpha 2.18*** 0.13 2.16*** 0.08 2.36*** 0.07 
Number of observations 882  880  877  
Log pseudo likelihood -613.47  -1564.72  -1128.67  
P- value Chi
2
 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Pseudo R
2
 0.0628  0.0198  0.0323  
LR Chibar
2
 1276.72  150000  6017.65  
P-value Chibar
2
 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Note: Frequency of transfers refers to the number of times the transfer has been received in the past 12 months/ 
before migration. Reference categories are in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 5. Frequency of receiving transfers before or after migration: Results from NBRM and tests of differences in 
coefficients 
 
 Financial transfers Good transfers Service transfers All transfers combined 
 
Before 
migr. 
After 
migr. 
Diff. 
(after - 
before) 
Before 
migr. 
After 
migr. 
Diff. 
(after - 
before) 
Before 
migr. 
After 
migr. 
Diff. 
(after - 
before) 
Before 
migr. 
After 
migr. 
Diff. 
(after - 
before) 
Parent 2.67 1.41 -1.26 2.02 0.94 -1.08 1.02 -1.23 -2.25** 1.26 -0.17 -1.43 
Child -15.15 -0.6 14.55*** 0.16 2.75 2.59** 1.25 1.13 -0.12 1.24 1.23 -0.01 
Sibling 3.29 0.52 -2.77*** 1.15 0.25 -0.9 0.96 -0.94 -1.9*** 1.06 -0.51 -1.57*** 
Other 2.32 -1.11 -3.43*** -0.45 -0.2 0.25 -0.56 -2.13 -1.57** -0.41 -1.44 -1.03 
(Friends)             
(Other variables 
included)* 
 
(+) 
 
(+) 
  
(+) 
 
(+) 
  
(+) 
 
(+)  
 
(+) 
 
(+) 
 
Constant -1.03 -8.41 -7.38** -1.44 0.34 1.78 3.37 1.3 -2.07 2.91 0.92 -1.99 
Ln alpha  1.73*** 1.92***  2.28*** 1.72***  2.21*** 2.36***  1.86*** 1.52***  
N 340 542  345 535  346 531  356 524  
Log-likelihood -167 -416  -484 -610  -731 -820  -860 -1188  
P-value Chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.1490 0.0863  0.0352 0.0726  0.0184 0.0316  0.0208 0.0351  
Note: Frequency of transfers refers to the number of times the transfer has been received in the past 12 months or 12 past months before migration. The dummy for transfers 
from friends is the reference category for transfers received from all other family members. 
All other control variables included are the same as in Table 4 (The variable “Transfer after migration” does not apply here). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Origin districts of surveyed households 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 31
Annexes 
Table A1. Transfers received before and after migration 
 
 
Before migration (last 12 
months in 1991 or 1997) 
After migration (last 12 
months before the interview) 
Financial transfers 
 No Yes 
% yes/ 
total 
No Yes 
% yes/ 
total 
Parents & parents in law 46 5 9.80% 70 15 17.65% 
Children 10 0 0.00% 30 4 11.76% 
Siblings 130 33 20.25% 170 45 20.93% 
Relatives 99 9 8.33% 110 14 11.29% 
Friends 26 1 3.70% 84 20 19.23% 
Total 311 48 359 464 98 562 
% no(yes)/ total 87% 13% 100% 83% 17% 100% 
Good transfers 
 No Yes 
% yes/ 
total 
No Yes 
% yes/ 
total 
Parents & parents in law 37 15 28.85% 52 33 38.82% 
Children 7 3 30.00% 20 14 41.18% 
Siblings 117 49 29.52% 150 61 28.91% 
Relatives 92 17 15.60% 104 20 16.13% 
Friends 17 8 32.00% 79 25 24.04% 
Total 270 92 362 405 153 558 
Service transfers 
 No Yes 
% yes/ 
total 
No Yes 
% yes/ 
total 
Parents & parents in law 33 20 37.74% 54 30 35.71% 
Children 4 6 60.00% 21 13 38.24% 
Siblings 98 66 40.24% 156 58 27.10% 
Relatives 86 23 21.10% 109 15 12.10% 
Friends 17 10 37.04% 69 35 33.65% 
Total 238 125 363 409 151 560 
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 Table A2. Codified results from the qualitative interviews 
Question E.6 What kinds of contact do you have? 
Approximate response Number of observations 
More frequent 8 
Less frequent 6 
Question H4.1 How did the move to Tirana change your relations with other 
people (including family 
Approximate response Number of observations 
Feel closer 7 
Feel same 13 
More distant 6 
Family moved as well (physically closer) 10 
 
Approximate response Number of observations 
(Interact) more with friends 5 
Same 4 
Less 6 
Question H4.4 Can you describe the kind of support you receive from others? How 
is this different to the past, before you moved? 
Approximate response Number of observations 
Receive more support 6 
Receive same support 5 
Receive less support 5 
 
Approximate response Number of observations 
More financial support 3 
Same financial support 0 
Less  financial support 2 
 
Approximate response Number of observations 
More goods  0 
Same goods  1 
Less goods  6 
 
Approximate response Number of observations 
More services 0 
Same services 1 
Less services 4 
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Table A3. Sum of predicted and actual mean count of the tested models for 
frequencies of all transfers 
 
 Actual mean 
count 
Predicted mean 
count 
Difference Pearson 
PRM 0.788 0.597 0.852 8959.342 
NBRM  0.788 0.804 0.109 41.762 
ZIP 0.788 0.614 0.234 4409.25 
ZINB 0.788 0.801 0.105 41.056 
Note: PRM stands for Poisson regression, NBRM stands for Negative Binomial regression, ZIP 
stands for Zero-Inflated Poisson regression and ZINB stands for Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
regression. 
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 Table A4. Frequency of receiving all types of transfers combined: Results 
from NBRM 
 NBRM 
 Coef. st. error 
Main regression   
Transfer after migration -0.71*** 0.2 
Relative parent  -0.22 0.42 
Relative child  0.70 0.48 
Relative sibling -0.36 0.3 
Relative other -1.23*** 0.31 
Age hhh (now/ before migration) -0.01 0.01 
Education years hhh 0.18 0.51 
Hh income/ per capita, in logs 0.09*** 0.03 
Hhh’s religion Muslim 0.53 0.33 
Hhh’s origin Central 0.68* 0.35 
Hhh’s origin North-Central 0.43 0.41 
Hhh’s  origin Mountain 0.02 0.36 
Hh extended family (now/ before 
migration) -0.46** 0.20 
Number of children hh (now/ before 
migration) 0.21** 0.10 
Hh moved before 1997 0 0.02 
Age relative/ friend (now/ before 
migration) -0.01 0.01 
Gender relative/ friend  0.06 0.19 
Education years relative/ friend -0.06** 0.03 
Hh & relative/ friend same religion -0.25 0.45 
Hh & relative/ friend live in same 
district (now/ before migration) 0.88*** 0.21 
Constant 2.21** 1.03 
Number of observations 860 
Number of zero observations  
Log pseudo likelihood -2074 
LR Chi2 86.79 
P-value Chi2 0.00 
McFadden’s R2 0.020 
Note: Frequency of transfers refers to the number of times the transfer has been received in the past 12 months/ 
before migration 
Base for relatives (friends), , religion (other religions), household origin (coast) 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A5. Frequency of giving transfers to relatives and friends: Results from 
NBRM 
 Financial transfers Good transfers Service transfers 
 Coef. st. error Coef. st. error Coef. st. error 
Main regression       
Transfer after migration 0.82** 0.33 -0.97*** 0.23 -0.98*** 0.29 
Relative parent 1.71*** 0.58 1.16** 0.45 0.87 0.57 
Relative child 0.57 0.71 2.08*** 0.56 0.26 0.65 
Relative sibling 0.42 0.41 0.89*** 0.32 -0.24 0.4 
Relative other -0.56 0.43 0.17 0.34 -1.83*** 0.45 
Age hhh (now/ before 
migration) 
0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Gender hh head   -0.86 0.9 -1.35** 0.66 0.6 0.76 
Education years hhh 0.04 0.05 0.07* 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Hhh’s religion Muslim 1.52*** 0.52 1.20*** 0.39 0.29 0.5 
Hhh’s origin Central 0.17 0.52 -0.65 0.41 0.34 0.49 
Hhh’s origin North-Central 0.39 0.61 -0.93* 0.48 0.37 0.58 
Hhh’s  origin Mountain -0.41 0.54 -1.36*** 0.43 0.15 0.49 
Hh extended family (now/ 
before migration) 
0.17 0.32 -0.65*** 0.24 -0.58* 0.3 
Number of children hh 
(now/ before migration) 
0.2 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.13 
Years since migration 0.05 0.04 0.08*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.03 
Age relative/ friend (now/ 
before migration) 
-0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 
Gender relative/ friend  -0.89*** 0.28 0.01 0.22 -0.09 0.26 
Education years relative/ 
friend 
0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.04 
Hh & relative/ friend same 
religion 
-1 0.66 -0.05 0.50 -0.29 0.66 
Hh & relative/ friend live in 
same district (now/ before 
migration) 
0.25 0.31 0.71*** 0.25 0.88*** 0.28 
Constant -1.58 1.72 0.64 1.37 1.07 1.5 
Ln alpha 2.28*** 0.10 1.89*** 0.08 2.36*** 0.07 
Number of observations 880  868  867  
Log pseudo likelihood -847  -1351  -1567  
P- value Chi
2
 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Pseudo R
2
 0.033  0.0327  0.0323  
LR Chibar
2
 2867.73  6789.35  6017.65  
P-value Chibar
2
 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Note: Frequency of transfers refers to the number of times the transfer has given in the past 12 months/ before 
migration 
“Transfer after migration” is a dummy variable that is one for the observations for the period after migration 
Base for relatives (friends), religion (other religions), household origin (Coast) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
